


A Bird in the Hand ...



Awareness & Recognition that Microprocessors Introduce an Element of Complexity to the Control of Hazards in the Work Place




The Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory




Test Reactor Area






- Suppression system installed in 1971 to support reactor operations
- Reactor was inactivated in 1982
- Accident during routine breaker maintenance in July 1998






- System Modified in 1997 and microprocessor-based alarm panel installed
- Panel had Factory
 Mutual approval and
 was listed by
 Underwriters
 Laboratory





- CO₂ hazard identified in prejob briefing
- System was
 "impaired" as a
 safety barrier and
 not physically
 locked out





- Spurious signal generated on loss of power activated control heads
- Sensor on mechanical delay not installed (no alarm function)

INEEL

- Hazard CO2
- Barrier Electric Control Head
- Computer Controlled the Barrier
- Electronic Impairment versus Lockout
- Sensor not Installed to Detect Barrier Failure



Inadequate Fail-Safe Capability of Radiation Source Control System



- Hazard Radiation Source
- Barrier Shielding Wall & Door
- Interlock Switch Status of Barrier
- Sensor Radiation Detector
- Warning Alarms Flashing Light & Audible Signal




Inadequate Fail-Safe Capability of Radiation Source Control System




- Computer periodically checked status of interlock switch
- Interlock failed when technicians rebooted the computer
- Defense in depth other design and administrative controls alerted technicians to failure



Inadequate Fail-Safe Capability



Revised Fail-Safe Capability



Awareness & Recognition



- Identify and analyze
 situations where computers
 control safety barriers
- Develop and implement controls - plan for defense in depth

